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Version: v0.1.1
Status: Exploratory Note
Last updated: 2026-01-09
This exploratory note proposes a minimal logical typology for rule-like statements in science.
It argues that many scientific rules are treated as universal despite being conditional or probabilistic in structure. This implicit universalization produces apparent counterexamples, false expectations, and conceptual disputes that are not empirical in nature but structural.
Version 0.1.1 clarifies the scope and intent of the typology and makes explicit several assumptions that were implicit in the initial formulation.
This note addresses the logical status of rule-like statements, not their empirical truth, explanatory adequacy, or practical usefulness.
The proposed typology is not intended as a theory of science, nor as a prescriptive methodology. Its sole purpose is conceptual clarification: to distinguish different kinds of claims that are often conflated in scientific and quasi-scientific discourse.
Scientific discourse is saturated with rules, laws, principles, and general statements.
These are frequently formulated in universal language, even when their actual validity depends on unstated conditions or expresses statistical regularities.
As with all model-based claims, the decisive question is therefore not whether a rule is true, but:
What kind of claim is being made —
and under which conditions does it hold?
In practice, rule-like statements are often presented without an explicit declaration of their logical type.
Conditional validity is compressed into universal formulations, and probabilistic regularities are interpreted as necessities.
This implicit universalization leads to recurring problems:
The issue is not empirical error, but structural ambiguity at the level of claims.
To remove this ambiguity, a minimal and sufficient classification of rules can be introduced.
The typology distinguishes between universal, conditional, and probabilistic rules. These categories are mutually exclusive with respect to logical form, though they may refer to similar empirical phenomena.
A universal rule claims exceptionless validity within a specified domain.
Logical form:
∀x ∈ M : P(x)
Such rules admit no exceptions within their domain. A single counterexample invalidates the claim.
Universal rules therefore require extremely high standards of precision and justification and are rare outside formal systems such as mathematics and logic.
A conditional rule asserts validity only under explicitly stated conditions.
Logical form:
∀x ∈ M : (B(x) → P(x))
No claim is made outside the specified conditions. Apparent exceptions indicate unmet or violated conditions, not rule failure.
Most empirical “laws” in the natural and social sciences fall into this category, despite often being presented in universal language.
A probabilistic rule describes regularities in terms of likelihood rather than necessity.
Simplified form:
Pr(Y | B) = p, with 0 < p < 1
Even when conditions are met, outcomes are not guaranteed. Deviations are expected and only meaningful at the statistical level.
Probabilistic rules dominate domains involving complex, adaptive, or social systems.
The notation used above draws from elementary predicate logic and probability theory.
It is intended to clarify the type of claim being made, not to formalize empirical content.
Several recurrent errors arise from failing to distinguish between rule types:
These errors are structural rather than empirical.
A minimal meta-rule follows:
Rule-like statements should be explicitly identified as
universal, conditional, or probabilistic.
This identification clarifies logical status without restricting substantive inquiry or empirical investigation.
Many disputes about whether a rule “holds” are in fact disputes about what kind of rule is being claimed.
Making the rule type explicit resolves apparent contradictions without requiring new data.
This document is an exploratory note.
It intentionally refrains from disciplinary claims, empirical examples, or normative prescriptions. Its purpose is conceptual clarification and logical orientation.
Wende, A. (2026).
On the Typing of Rules: Why Scientific Rules Must Be Classified as Universal, Conditional, or Probabilistic.
Exploratory Notes, systemic-effect.org. Version 0.1.1.
https://systemic-effect.org/exploratory-notes/typing-of-rules/v0.1.1
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